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1. Introduction
When asked about the origins and severity of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis, most observers
point towards a high degree of uncertainty about the quality of individual banks’ balance
sheets.1 Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that financial firms are particularly
opaque.2 Banks are also subject to special public disclosure requirements which have
recently been further strengthened.3
At the same time, observers acknowledge that it “is important to protect proprietary
business models and incentives to innovate. Public disclosure of a firm’s positions also
raises concerns about predatory or copycat trading by competitors” (Squam Lake Re-
port, 2010). Implemented disclosure requirements reflect this warning by specifying
deliberate time lags and a suitable degree of aggregation. However, some commentators
resolutely contest the socially beneficial role of proprietary information.4
These observations raise three research questions: (1.) Why are banks opaque? (2.) Is
there a need for policy? (3.) What is the optimal level of bank transparency? Existing
contributions usually assume some exogenous ad-hoc cost of public disclosure5 or they
find that opacity increases the liquidity of certain assets in an environment of asymmet-
rically informed traders.6 While in the policy debate proprietary information is often
named as a potential limit of transparency, this point has not yet been formally stud-
ied in the economic literature. One reason for this is that existing models of financial
opacity do not feature strategic competition among intermediaries.
Preview of the Model and Results
In this model, financial intermediaries assume a socially valuable role by spending re-
sources in order to learn more about the profitability of a set of investment projects.
One interpretation of this assumption is that relationship lenders can monitor borrowers
at some cost and thereby acquire information which is not available to outsiders at the
beginning of the investment project.
Importantly, information is a public good if intermediaries’ balance sheets are trans-
parent since there is a one-to-one mapping between information about investment op-
portunities and an intermediary’s optimal portfolio choice. This is of no concern in a
1The Squam Lake Report (2010) identifies a critical lack of information about the risk exposure
of financial firms. Bernanke (2010) agrees with the perception of opaqueness as one of the “structural
weaknesses in the shadow banking system.”
2See for example Morgan (2002), Iannotta (2006), or Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2013).
3Pillar 3 of the 2004 Basel II Accords specifies public disclosure requirements for banks including
information on asset holdings and risk exposure. In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires the
Federal Reserve to publish a summary of the results of its annual supervisory stress test of large bank
holding companies. The published stress test results include company-specific measures of risk exposure
to selected scenarios.
4Chamley, Kotlikoff and Polemarchakis (2012) warn of “the lethal mix of proprietary information
and leverage.”
5See for example Kurlat and Veldkamp (2012), or Alvarez and Barlevy (2013).
6This is the case in Pagano and Volpin (2012), Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m and Ordon˜ez (2013), and
Monnet and Quintin (2013).
2
setup with a monopolistic intermediary. However, once financial intermediaries compete
strategically for households’ funds, information spillovers become an issue. This is true
even if two intermediaries fund different projects as long as the returns to these two
projects are not completely independent. Opaque balance sheets convert information
about investment projects from a public good into a marketable private commodity.
But this opaqueness comes at a social cost if the information gathered by relationship
lenders through monitoring has a value for outsiders as well.
In principle, households value information about investment projects as it helps them
to decide on how much resources to hand over to intermediaries. But if households can
choose between investing in a fully transparent intermediary and an opaque competitor,
then each single household will paradoxically choose the latter. Why is it that the socially
harmful behavior of opaque intermediaries gets rewarded by the market? The opaque
intermediary can rely on its private information as well as on the information publicly
shared by its transparent competitor, while the transparent intermediary only partic-
ipates in its own information set. Hence, the opaque intermediary knows more about
the profitability of investment projects than its transparent competitor and therefore its
portfolio choice will be better. In this situation, households face a prisoner’s dilemma:
if they could coordinate to invest only in transparent intermediaries, each one of them
would be better off as in this case there would be no incentive for intermediaries to
hide information from the public. But once an intermediary reduces disclosure, it earns
a competitive advantage over the transparent rival because of its superior information
and it becomes profitable for households to invest in the opaque intermediary. Strategic
competition between the two intermediaries results in a “race to the bottom” which
leads to complete opacity and a high degree of aggregate uncertainty for households.7
Policy measures can improve upon this market outcome by imposing minimum dis-
closure requirements on banks. Complete disclosure is socially undesirable as this elimi-
nates all incentives for intermediaries to spend resources on the monitoring of investment
projects. The social planner optimally chooses an intermediate level of transparency by
trading off the benefits of reducing aggregate uncertainty for households (Blackwell ef-
fect8) against the incentives for costly monitoring (Grossman-Stiglitz effect9).
Related Literature
The main argument used in support of mandatory public disclosure is improved market
discipline. Public information about the expected profitability of individual banks helps
financial markets to allocate resources efficiently across financial firms. Allegedly, it also
prevents bank managers from excessive risk taking and thereby contributes to financial
stability. These points seem to be very much in line with plain common sense and
7Because of information spillovers and strategic competition, the familiar unravelling argument by
Grossman and Hart (1980) does not apply here.
8Blackwell (1951) shows that for a single decision maker more information about fundamentals is
always desirable.
9Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) demonstrate that full transparency eliminates all incentives for
costly information acquisition.
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this might be the reason why economic research has tended to focus on the potential
costs of financial transparency rather than on its social benefits.10 There are only a
few examples of formal models which explain why market forces on their own are not
capable of creating a sufficient level of bank transparency.
These models are generally of recent vintage. Chen and Hasan (2006) show that bank
managers may want to delay disclosure in order to avoid efficient bank runs. Mandatory
disclosure rules can restore market discipline in this case. An important assumption
here is that bank managers cannot commit to a pre-selected timing of disclosure. This
would remove the need for policy intervention.
The experience of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 is reflected in an increased interest
in the topic. In Bouvard, Chaigneau, and de Motta (2012), depositors know the health
of the average bank in the economy but only a regulator knows the asset quality of
each individual bank. During normal times, informational opacity prevents inefficient
bank runs. However, if investors observe that the financial sector is hit by a crisis,
public information about individual banks is desirable in order to prevent a run on
the whole financial system. Only the regulator can provide this information, as banks’
announcements are not verifiable. A similar result is found by Spargoli (2012). During
normal times, there is no policy need as banks with high quality assets can separate
themselves from low quality banks. However, during a financial crisis separation becomes
too costly and financial markets are unable to discriminate between banks of different
quality.
Also Alvarez and Barlevy (2012) study an endogenous lack of information about the
location and size of bank losses. Banks form a financial network in this model which
exposes them to the credit risk of their counterparties. This gives rise to an information
externality as information about the financial health of one bank is also valuable with
respect to the risk exposure of its counterparties. Crucial for the authors’ results is an
exogenous fixed cost of public disclosure.
The contributions cited above do not model banks’ portfolio choice and there is no
feedback effect from public disclosure to a bank’s market share and the quality of its
assets. In contrast, this paper introduces the problem of costly information acquisition
to the analysis which endogenizes the costs of public disclosure.
As mentioned above, the social costs of bank transparency have been studied at least
as extensively as the potential benefits. For instance, Moreno and Takalo (2012) find
that negative spillovers of bank failures result in an oversupply of voluntary disclosure.
If anything, policy should induce banks to disclose less information to the public than
they would like to. Also Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m and Ordon˜ez (2013) warn of the
perils of bank transparency. In their model, it is precisely the role of banks to collect
socially valuable information about asset quality without disclosing it to the public.
The negative role of public information in this model is related to Hirshleifer (1971).11
Consumers are exposed to liqudity shocks. This makes them unwilling to invest in risky
10This is true also for two recent review articles on the trade-offs involved in financial transparency.
See Landier and Thesmar (2011) and Goldstein and Sapra (2012).
11Hirshleifer (1971) shows that disclosure is socially harmful whenever its primary effect is to redis-
tribute wealth among agents.
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projects if information about project losses become public. A bank which can hide these
project losses from the public is able to shut down the Hirshleifer effect and to channel
households’ savings to investment projects. Banks allow households to share both the
risks of production and of stochastic liquidity needs. More opacity is better in this
environment.
Pagano and Volpin (2012) address the phenomenon of intransparent securities traded
on secondary markets rather than intransparent bank balance sheets. Also here banks
can increase liquidity through opacity. But in contrast to the findings of Dang, Gorton,
Holmstro¨m and Ordon˜ez (2013), imposing mandatory disclosure rules can be welfare
increasing in Pagano and Volpin (2012). The authors study the problem of a bank which
offers asset-backed securities of heterogeneous quality. The quality of these securities is
unknown to the bank. The fact that sophisticated investors can learn the quality of these
securities renders them unattractive for unsophisticated potential buyers. The bank can
increase the liquidity of its securities in this case by rendering them intransparent and
hard to assess even for sophisticated investors. But this might create a problem of
adverse selection on a secondary market triggering social costs which the issuing bank
does not fully internalize.
In Kurlat and Veldkamp (2012), a risky asset in fixed supply is sold on a market
consisting of rational investors and noise traders. The price-insensitive noise traders
systematically lose money as they move the asset return against themselves. The sensi-
tivity of the asset return to noise demand is increasing in uncertainty. This is because
uncertainty about asset quality increases the price of arbitrage performed by rational
investors. The option of rational investors to respond with their demand to the ac-
tions of noise traders introduces a convexity to their objective function which makes
them effectively risk-loving. Public disclosure reduces uncertainty and therefore also the
opportunity of investors to benefit from noise traders’ erratic actions. This result is over-
come in case of an equilibrium with asymmetric information among rational investors.
Noise traders always benefit from public disclosure.
The setup used by Kurlat and Veldkamp (2012) relates to earlier contributions by
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 1990). These authors consider the problem of a single
agent with an exogenous endowment of socially valuable information. They show that
under certain conditions the information monopolist may find it profitable to act as a
financial intermediary for uninformed investors. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 1990) and
Kurlat and Veldkamp (2012) differ from our model in the assumption that assets are not
in perfectly elastic supply and therefore asset prices partially reveal information. Fur-
thermore, these contributions do not consider the endogenous production of information
nor the role of competition in determining its supply to the public.
This paper is also related to the more general role of public information in shaping
market outcomes. Morris and Shin (2002) study the social value of public information
in an environment prone to coordination failures. Whenever public information is suffi-
ciently imprecise, this impedes social coordination and can be welfare decreasing. In the
model studied below, coordination failures play no role for the analysis of bank trans-
parency. Vives (2012) examines a general setting in which agent’s actions are partly
reflected by a public signal. He finds that the precision of public information always
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improves the market allocation.
While the formal analysis of public disclosure is a fairly recent phenomenon in the
banking context, it can build on an extensive tradition in the literature on corporate
finance and accounting. This literature has generally acknowldeged that even in the
absence of policy intervention, there are good reasons to expect a considerable degree of
voluntary disclosure by firms which compete for funds on capital markets (see for instance
Grossman and Hart, 1981). Diamond (1985) shows that public disclosure is preferred by
shareholders because it prevents investors from wasting resources on private information
acquisition.
We have seen above that existing models of bank transparency abstract from the
costs of releasing proprietary information. This is at odds with the central role which
is generally attributed to confidential information in banking services. In the context of
non-financial firms, proprietary information has been considered by the accounting liter-
ature from very early on. Verrecchia (1983) studies the trade-off between transparency
and an exogenous fixed proprietary cost of information disclosure. A similar trade-off is
examined by Dye (1986). Darrough and Stoughton (1990) endogenize the private costs
of proprietary disclosure in an entry game. However, these models do not allow for a
formal welfare analysis of eventual policy interventions.
Information externalities as a justification of mandatory disclosure rules are considered
in an early contribution by Foster (1980). In a formal model, Dye (1990) demonstrates
that in the presence of externalities (e.g. due to proprietary information) mandatory
and voluntary disclosure tend to diverge. Likewise, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) study
information externalities. Since there are private costs to increasing the precision of
public signals, the supply of public information is inefficiently low in their model. These
models are tailored primarily to non-financial firms and do not capture the peculiarities
of the financial sector which are examined below.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in section 2. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium allocation on the market for financial intermediation in the
absence of mandatory disclosure rules. Optimal bank transparency is studied in section
4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a short discussion of potential enhancements of
the model.
2. Model Setup
Consider a simple model economy inhabited by many small and identical households of
unit mass. Households aim at smoothing consumption over time by investing in two
different banks. These two banks have access to risky investment opportunities.
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2.1. Households
In period t, the representative household owns a certain amount wt of the the nume´raire
good. She decides how to allocate consumption over time. Her preferences regarding
any consumption path {ct+i}∞i=0 may be described by the function:
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(ct+i)
∣∣∣∣QHt
}
, (1)
where E is the expectation operator conditional on the date t information of the repre-
sentative household QHt , and β ∈ [0, 1] gives the rate of time preference. The function
u : [0,∞] → R is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. In
addition, we assume non-increasing absolute risk aversion. This implies: u′′′(c) > 0.
Households have no direct access to investment projects. They can invest in the two
banks which are active in this model economy. Accordingly, the household’s budget
constraint is given by:
ct + b
A
t+1 + b
B
t+1 ≤ bAt rAt + bBt rBt + TAt + TBt ≡ wt , (2)
where bAt and b
B
t indicate the amount of securities bought from bank A and bank B,
respectively. The associated gross returns are indicated by rAt and r
B
t . The households
are the joint owners of the two banks. Accordingly, eventual bank profits TAt and T
B
t
are uniformly distributed among households.
2.2. Banks
In contrast to households, banks have access to risky investment projects in addition to
common storage. These projects are completely homogeneous and in perfectly elastic
supply. The return to risky investment projects is perfectly correlated across projects.
Return risk is therefore systematic and not insurable.12 Banks spend resources in order to
learn about the future performance of these risky projects. They maximize the expected
utility of their owners as given by (1) subject to the budget constraint:
T jt+1 =
(
bjt+1 − kjt+1
)
+ kjt+1 Rt+1 − bjt+1 rjt+1 − gjt+1, for j = A,B. (3)
Bank j manages an amount bjt+1 of the nume´raire good lent to it by households. The
amount of funds invested in risky projects by bank j is indicated by kjt+1. These funds
yield an uncertain return of Rt+1. The remainder (b
j
t+1−kjt+1) is put into riskless storage.
Resources spent on learning about Rt+1 are given by g
j
t+1.
12Alternatively, one could think of a single risky project with a linear return.
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2.3. Projects and Information
The gross return on risky projects is persistent over time:
Rt+1 = ζ0 + ζ1Rt + εt+1 ,
where ζ0 > 0, 0 < ζ1 < 1, and εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2). All agents in the economy, households
and bankers, publicly observe Rt after it is realized. In addition to Rt, each bank observes
at time t also a second signal Rˆjt+1 which likewise contains information about Rt+1:
Rˆjt+1 ∼ N (Rt+1,Σjt+1) , for j = A,B.
The precision of this additional signal can be improved at a cost:
Σjt+1 =
1
f(gjt+1)
, for j = A,B,
where f(g) is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. That is,
f(0) = 0 and zero expenditures on signal precision result in a bank signal which does
not contain any information about Rt+1. If a bank acquires a lot of information, this
informational advantage might result in a certain degree of market power. In order to
protect it, a bank may choose to hide its current portfolio choice from its competitor.
We assume that a bank is able to costlessly hide its current investment policy from
outsiders. This is important, because a bank’s portfolio choice could reveal its private
information about future project returns.
Informational opacity of bank balance sheets may protect a bank’s market power but
it also creates additional uncertainty for households. If banks wish to reveal some part
of their superior information, they can use a costless signal which is transmitted to the
public:
Qjt+1 ∼ N (Rˆjt+1, Σˆjt+1) , for j = A,B.
In this manner, banks are free to give away any part of their informational advantage
to the public. A perfect correlation between Qjt+1 and Rˆ
j
t+1 (Σˆ
j
t+1 = 0) corresponds
to complete transparency and consequently also zero uncertainty for outsiders about
bank j’s current portfolio choice. On the other hand, zero correlation (Σˆjt+1 = ∞)
is equivalent to complete opacity of bank j’s balance sheet and a maximum level of
information asymmetry.
2.4. Timing
The timing is as follows. Bank A and bank B enter period t with a predetermined port-
folio of riskless storage and risky investment projects. At the beginning of period t, the
gross return Rt is realized and publicly observed by all agents in the economy. House-
holds who invested in bank j last period receive a cash flow of bjt r
j
t in return. Eventual
bank profits are distributed among households. Banks choose how much resources gjt+1
to spend on information acquisition and they choose how much of this information to
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share with others. Private and public signals of the future return are realized. House-
holds divide their wealth between consumption and bank investment. The two banks A
and B choose a portfolio of investment projects and storage.
3. Equilibrium
Definition Given some initial wealth level of households wt, a competitive equilibrium
in this economy consists of values for ΣˆAt+i+1 and Σˆ
B
t+i+1, of prices r
A
t+i+1 and r
B
t+i+1, and
quantities ct+i, b
j
t+i+1, k
j
t+i+1, g
j
t+i+1, T
j
t+i+1, for j = A,B and i = 0, 1, 2, ..., such that for
all histories: (1.) households solve their individual optimization problem, (2.) bank A
and bank B maximize the expected utility of households subject to price competition in
the market for financial intermediation, and (3.) the market for financial intermediation
clears.
Households observe the performance of the bank’s chosen portfolio of intermediated
funds:
Πjt+1 =
(
bjt+1 − kjt+1
)
+ kjt+1 Rt+1
bjt+1
, for j = A,B .
Hence, the return on bank securities rjt+1 can condition on this information. In principle,
the renumeration of banks for providing financial services could take on many forms. In
the following, we consider contracts of financial intermediation of the following class:
Assumption Households’ return on bank funding is given by rjt+1 = Π
j
t+1 − δjt+1, where
δjt+1 is a non-negative scalar which is known at time t with certainty.
This assumption is without loss of generality. Since households are both the holders of
bank securities as well as the owners of the two banks, no insurance contract between
households and banks can be profitable. Ultimately, households bear all the risk asso-
ciated with Rt+1, no matter how it is divided between banks and households. It follows
that a non-stochastic price of banking services δjt+1 is optimal.
The model economy described above may be understood as a team decision problem as
defined by Marschak (1955) and Radner (1962). Households and banks pursue a common
objective function by maximizing expected lifetime utility of households. To this end,
households choose a consumption and savings policy, while banks invest in information
acquisition, decide on how much of this information to share with other agents, set a
price of financial intermediation, and select an investment portfolio on the basis of the
information available to them. In principle, it would be desirable in this environment of
costless communication that every agent knows all information available in the model
economy at any given point in time. In the following, we will see that bank competition
in combination with the public good character of information puts severe restrictions on
the information allocations which are compatible with a competitive equilibrium.
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3.1. Households
In period t, the representative household divides her wealth wt between consumption
and risky bank securities:
max
ct,bAt+1,b
B
t+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(ct+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt+1, QBt+1, Rt
}
subject to: ct+i + b
A
t+i+1 + b
B
t+i+1 ≤ bAt+i rAt+i + bBt+i rBt+i + TAt+i + TBt+i ≡ wt+i.
The information QHt = {QAt+1, QBt+1, Rt} on which her decision at time t is based depends
on the quality of information collected by banks as well as on the precision of QAt+1 and
QBt+1, i.e. bank transparency. More precise information reduces the exposure of house-
holds’ consumption plans to aggregate uncertainty. The intertemporal Euler equation is
given by:
u′(ct) = β E
{
u′(ct+1) r
j
t+1 |QAt+1, QBt+1, Rt
}
, for j = A,B.
Households demand bank securities with high and safe returns.
3.2. Banks: Exogenous Transparency
Consider first bank behavior for the special case that exogenously ΣˆAt+1 = Σˆ
B
t+1 = 0.
There is no asymmetry of information in this economy, as QAt+1 and Q
B
t+1 are perfect
signals of RˆAt+1 and Rˆ
B
t+1. Consequently, all agents share identical expectations about
the distribution of future project returns. Bayesian inference yields as the updated
probability distribution of future project returns:
Rt+1 ∼ N
(
E
{
Rt+1
∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} , σ2ΣAt+1ΣBt+1σ2ΣAt+1 + σ2ΣBt+1 + ΣAt+1ΣBt+1
)
.
The optimal portfolio choice by banks is perfectly inferable for everyone. In this sense,
banks’ balance sheets are completely transparent.
The two bankers play a Bertrand game. Their intermediation services are perfect
substitutes, as both banks have access to the same information set. Hence, also their
portfolio choice and the distribution of future bank returns are identical. If the two banks
charge the same price δAt+1 = δ
B
t+1, we assume that the households’ demand is split evenly
between them. The resulting equilibrium allocation shows a number of characteristics
which are familiar from the literature on Bertrand competition games.
Lemma 3.1. In equilibrium, both banks make exactly zero profits: T jt+1 = 0, which im-
plies: bjt+1 δ
j
t+1 = g
j
t+1, for j = A,B. They both choose a portfolio of intermediated funds
which maximizes the expected utility of households subject to the available information.
Proof. The proof works by contradiction. Consider first equilibrium bank profits.
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1. Banks make exactly zero profits: Assume that bank A makes positive profits. In
this case, bank B can capture the whole demand for financial intermediation by
choosing the same portfolio as bank A and charging δBt+1 = δ
A
t+1−η (with η > 0). If
η is sufficiently small, this increases bank B’s profit. This excludes the possibility
that banks make positive profits in equilibrium.
2. Banks choose a portfolio which maximizes the expected utility of households: As-
sume that bank A chooses a portfolio which does not maximize the expected utility
of households, taking as given banks’ expenditures gAt+1 and g
B
t+1. In this case, bank
B can choose a portfolio which caters more to the needs of households. Note that
there is an η > 0, such that bank B charges a spread δBt+1 = δ
A
t+1 + η and still
captures the complete demand for financial intermediation. Bank B makes posi-
tive profits in this case. This excludes the possibility that banks choose a portfolio
which does not maximize the expected utility of households.
What does this imply for banks’ investment policy? Bank j chooses its portfolio of
investment projects according to:
max
kjt+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(ct+i)
∣∣∣∣Qt
}
subject to: ct+1 + b
A
t+2 + b
B
t+2 ≤ bAt+1
(
ΠAt+1 − δAt+1
)
+ bBt+1
(
ΠBt+1 − δBt+1
)
,
bjt+1
(
Πjt+1 − δjt+1
)
=
(
bjt+1 − kjt+1
)
+ kjt+1Rt+1 − gjt+1 , for j = A,B ,
Qt =
{
RˆAt+1, Rˆ
B
t+1, Rt
}
, and
Rˆjt+1 ∼ N (Rt+1,Σjt+1) , with: Σjt+1 =
1
f(gjt+1)
, for j = A,B .
The chosen portfolio is characterized by the following first order condition:
E
{
∂ u(ct+1)
∂ ct+1
(Rt+1 − 1 )
∣∣∣∣Qt} = 0 . (4)
Some part of the risk associated with investment projects is endogenous, as banks can
spend resources to reduce uncertainty. Proposition 3.2 describes the market allocation
of information expenditures.
Proposition 3.2. In equilibrium, uncertainty about future project returns is maximum:
gAt+1 = g
B
t+1 = 0. This implies: Σ
A
t+1 = Σ
B
t+1 =∞.
Proof. Assume that bank A spends gAt+1 > 0 on reducing public uncertainty about
future project returns. In this case, also bank B must spend gBt+1 = g
A
t+1 on information
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acquisition in equilibrium. Otherwise, one bank could charge a lower spread than the
other bank and make positive profits.
Consider now an equilibrium with gAt+1 = g
B
t+1 > 0. In this case, bank A can reduce
gAt+1 somewhat and charge δ
A
t+1 = δ
B
t+1 − η (for η > 0). Uncertainty is higher now and
total demand for bank securities lower. But bank B’s forecast is hurt by this in the
same way as bank A’s prediction of future returns. Hence, bank A captures the whole
demand for bank securities. If η is sufficiently small, this increases bank A’s profit. This
excludes the possibility that gAt+1 > 0 or g
B
t+1 > 0 in equilibrium.
The public signals RˆAt+1 and Rˆ
B
t+1 provided by banks contain no information at all:
E{Rt+1 | RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} = E{Rt+1 |Rt}. Precision of the public signal Rˆjt+1 is a public
good. If bank A spends resources on improving its signal, this increases the information
set for bank A in the same way as for bank B (as well as for all the households). Bertrand
competition between the two banks does not permit bank A to incur these extra costs,
which reduce the return on its securities but which do not translate into a competitive
advantage with respect to bank B. Atomistic bank investors do not internalize that
their investment behavior influences the quality of public information in this economy.
A social planner would choose the precision of the public signals RˆAt+1 and Rˆ
B
t+1 by
solving the following optimization program:
max
gAt+1,g
B
t+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt
}
subject to: c∗t+i =
(
b∗t+i − k∗t+i
)
+ k∗t+iRt+i − b∗t+i+1 − gAt+i − gBt+i ,
b∗t+i+1 = b
(
RˆAt+i+1, Rˆ
B
t+i+1, Rt+i
)
, k∗t+i+1 = k
(
RˆAt+i+1, Rˆ
B
t+i+1, Rt+i
)
,
and Rˆjt+i+1 ∼ N (Rt+i+1,Σjt+i+1) , with: Σjt+i+1 =
1
f(gjt+i+1)
, for j = A,B .
At that point in time when the planner chooses gAt+1 and g
B
t+1, she anticipates the benefits
of observing more reliable signals RˆAt+1 and Rˆ
B
t+1. The amount of savings b
∗
t+1 and
the investment policy k∗t+1 can both be set more precisely when information is better.
Proposition 3.3 describes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 3.3. The first best level of information expenditures is positive:
0 < gA
∗
t+1 = g
B∗
t+1 < ∞ .
A proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A. But the result is quite
intuitive. The first marginal unit of resources spent on information acquisition has a
very high marginal impact on the precision of the respective signal. This reduction in
aggregate uncertainty is valuable as it allows for a more precise savings decision by the
planner. Only an interior choice can be optimal as the marginal impact of an additional
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increase in information expenditures is falling towards zero. The concavity of f(g)
implies that the planner will optimally invest equal amounts in the precision of both
signals.
A high degree of risk aversion increases the marginal benefit of an additional unit of
the nume´raire good spent on information acquisition. Likewise, high uncertainty, e.g.
because of a high value of σ2, and the efficiency of learning, as measured by the steepness
of f(g), contribute to a high optimal level of information expenditures.
We have seen how the planner chooses the optimal level of signal precision. The market
allocation under full transparency of bank balance sheets falls short of this first best level
of public information. Expectations about the future are perfectly homogeneous across
all agents in the model economy, but these expectations are based on a minimum amount
of information.
3.3. Banks: Endogenous Transparency
So far we have assumed that banks’ balance sheets are completely transparent and
everybody can infer banks’ expectations about future returns. Now, we consider the
more general case which allows banks to choose the precision of their public signals QAt+1
and QBt+1 themselves. Proposition 3.4 states that banks will always choose a maximum
level of informational opacity if they are free to do so.
Proposition 3.4. In equilibrium, households’ uncertainty about future project returns
is maximum: ΣˆAt+1 = Σˆ
B
t+1 =∞.
Proof. Assume that bank A and bank B spend any amount gAt+1 and g
B
t+1 on improving
the precision of the signals RˆAt+1 and Rˆ
A
t+1. By reducing the precision of Q
A
t+1, bank
A can costlessly reduce the precision of bank B’s forecast E{Rt+1 − 1 |QBt }. Bank
A’s forecast remains unaffected by the precision of QAt+1. Since households observe the
precision of the banks’ signals QAt+1 and Q
B
t+1 and information expenditures g
A
t+1 and g
B
t+1,
they know the forecast accuracy of banks. Ceteris paribus, households buy securities
of the bank with more information about future project returns. This gives bank A
a strong incentive to marginally decrease the precision of its signal QAt+1. Bank B in
turn can regain competitiveness by reducing the precision of QBt+1. The only equilibrium
allocation is given by QAt+1 = Q
B
t+1 =∞.
Transparency implies that bank j’s signal Rˆjt+1 is public information. By keeping
an opaque balance sheet, the information of bank j’s private signal becomes private.
This does not change bank j’s information set, but it creates more uncertainty for
the competitor bank. Households like transparency, but the market does not punish a
bank for being opaque if this bank has more information about future returns then the
competitor bank. As information is private now, does this provide incentives for banks
to invest in information about future returns? On the one hand, bank A securities lose
in value as information expenditures are costs which depress the return. On the other
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hand, bank A’s portfolio choice k(RˆAt+1, Rt) benefits from the higher precision of Rˆ
A
t+1:
bAt+1 r
A
t+1 = b
A
t+1 [Π
A
t+1 − δAt+1] = bAt+1 + k(RˆAt+1, Rt)
[
Rt+1 − 1
] − gAt+1 .
Under Bertrand competition, bank A’s market share is extremely sensitive to the at-
tractiveness of its intermediation services in comparison with the rival bank. Therefore,
bank A invests in information acquisition in order to increase households’ valuation of
bank A securities relative to bank B securities:
max
gAt+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt
}
− E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cBt+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt
}
subject to: cjt+i = b(Rt+i−1) + k(Rˆ
j
t+i, Rt+i−1)
[
Rt+i − 1
] − b(Rt+i) − gjt+i ,
and Rˆjt+1 ∼ N (Rt+1,Σjt+1) , with: Σjt+1 =
1
f(gjt+1)
, for j = A,B .
Proposition 3.5. Under full opacity, banks’ investment in information about future
returns is higher than the first best allocation under full transparency:
0 < gA
∗
t+1 = g
B∗
t+1 < g
A∗∗
t+1 = g
B∗∗
t+1 < ∞ .
The formal proof of Proposition 3.5 is deferred to the appendix. Bank opacity provides
an environment in which it is profitable for banks to invest in the precision of their private
signals. They even spend more resources on information acquisition than a planner would
choose to in a world of complete transparency. Under transparency, one unit of the
nume´raire good spent on informational precision improves the portfolio choice of both
banks as well as households’ savings decision. In the opacity case, each bank observes
only its own signal and households do not learn anything about Rt+1 in addition to the
observation of Rt. Therefore, a given level of information expenditures results in a much
higher level of uncertainty under opacity than in the case of complete transparency. As
the marginal value of information expenditures is increasing in uncertainty, this leads
to the result of overproduction of information in combination with an undersupply of
communication.
4. Optimal Opacity
From the previous analysis, it has become clear that there is a trade-off between in-
formation production and information transmission. Maximum transmission induces
minimum production and vice versa. The problem of bank regulation is to find an in-
termediate level of bank opacity which sacrifices some degree of information production
by banks in favor of a reduced level of uncertainty for households. Consider bank A’s
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optimal choice of gAt+1 for some intermediate level of opacity Σˆt+1:
max
gAt+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt
}
− E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cBt+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt
}
subject to: cjt+i = b(QHt+i−1) + k(Q
j
t+i−1)
[
Rt+i − 1
] − b(QHt+i) − gjt+i ,
QHt+i = {QAt+i+1, QBt+i+1, Rt+i} , QAt+i = {RˆAt+i+1, QBt+i+1, Rt+i} ,
QBt+i = {QAt+i+1, RˆBt+i+1, Rt+i} , Qjt+1 ∼ N (Rˆjt+1, Σˆt+1) ,
and Rˆjt+1 ∼ N (Rt+1,Σjt+1) , with: Σjt+1 =
1
f(gjt+1)
, for j = A,B .
Each bank optimally invests more in information as the informational spillovers to its
rival get reduced through increased opacity.
Lemma 4.1. Banks’ investment in information about future returns is strictly increasing
in Σˆt+1. Information expenditures become less sensitive as opacity tends towards infinity:
lim
Σˆt+1→∞
g′(Σˆt+1) = 0 .
A proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix A. Under complete transparency
(i.e. Σˆt+1 = 0), investments in information benefit the rival bank just as much as the
bank which actually pays for the improvements in public information. This public good
character of information renders its costly acquisition unprofitable. As Σˆt+1 is growing,
the rival bank participates less and less in improvements to bank A’s information set.
The optimal choice of information expenditures increases in value until it converges to
the solution to the bank’s problem under complete opacity as derived above. For high
values of opacity, the signal-to-noise ratio of banks’ public signals becomes less and less
responsive to additional changes in opacity. This is reflected by the vanishing sensitivity
of g(Σˆt+1).
Bank competition in combination with the public good character of information puts
severe restrictions on the feasible allocations in this economy. The problem of the social
planner is now to set an optimal level of bank transparency. By changing the information
structure, the planner can indirectly influence the equilibrium outcome. The optimal
choice trades off two effects: more transparency (1.) reduces the information asymmetry
between households and banks, but it also (2.) results in less production of socially
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valuable information by banks.
max
Σˆt+1∈R≥0
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QHt
}
subject to: cAt+i = b(QHt+i−1) + k(QAt+i−1)
[
Rt+i − 1
] − b(QHt+i) − g(Σˆt+1) ,
QHt+i = {QAt+i+1, QBt+i+1, Rt+i} , QAt+i = {RˆAt+i+1, QBt+i+1, Rt+i} ,
Qjt+1 ∼ N (Rˆjt+1, Σˆt+1) , and
Rˆjt+1 ∼ N (Rt+1,Σjt+1) , with: Σjt+1 =
1
f
(
g(Σˆt+1)
) , for j = A,B .
Recall that households regard both banks as equally well informed in equilibrium. There-
fore, the two types of bank securities are perfect substitutes. Without loss of generality,
here we will consider the impact of changes in opacity on the expected value of bank
A securities. The same reasoning holds for the case of bank B securities. Proposition
4.2 states that the optimal degree of bank transparency has no corner solution. It must
therefore differ from the market allocation.
Proposition 4.2. The socially optimal choice of bank opacity is 0 < Σˆ∗t+1 <∞.
A formal proof of Proposition 4.2 is deferred to Appendix A. In the neighborhood of
complete transparency, a local increase in opacity actually decreases uncertainty. This is
because the positive effect of opacity on information production outweighs the increase
in noise of banks’ public signals. The opposite is true for high levels of opacity. Here,
a marginal reduction of opacity reduces aggregate uncertainty for households without
affecting information production by banks in any significant way.
Proposition 4.2 demonstrates the potential gains from policy intervention. Imposing
minimum transparency requirements on banks leads to a Pareto improvement in this
environment. The optimal degree of bank transparency generally depends on the func-
tional form of f(g) which determines the social value of costly information acquisition
by banks. If this function is very steep, then society has a lot to lose from reductions in
information expenditures by banks and the optimal level of bank transparency will be
relatively low. The same is true for high levels of fundamental uncertainty (σ2) and risk
aversion, as these two factors likewise increase the social benefit of costly information
acquisition. Note however one interesting aspect of bank opacity in general: an increase
in the degree of asymmetry of information between households and banks may result in
a welfare gain.
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5. Discussion
We have seen that the private costs of public disclosure of banks’ asset positions and risk
exposure are particularly high if proprietary information becomes public. The mecha-
nism described above applies to a wide range of credit decisions and asset classes. The
problem of opacity becomes particularly severe whenever (1.) bank competition is fierce,
and whenever (2.) investment in information acquisition by banks can result in a con-
siderable information advantage.
Note that bank competition is part of the problem in this model and not part of the
solution. The equilibrium allocation does not change qualitatively whether two banks
compete for households’ savings or a large number of N banks. On the other hand, a
monopolist banker in a non-contestable market for financial intermediation would be in
a position to reveal all available information to the public without the threat of adverse
consequences for her market share. The inefficiencies with respect to the supply of
public information described above would cease to exist. However, other well-known
inefficiencies are bound to arise in the presence of market power.
In the analysis above it is assumed that the information which banks choose to trans-
mit to the markets are verifiable. In practice, banks report summary statistics of ag-
gregated asset positions and risk sensitivities estimated for selected scenarios. These
reporting instruments still leave some room for financial window dressing. This may
even be intended by regulation as complete transparency is not desirable. On the other
hand, information about asset positions is socially valuable to the extent that the risk
characteristics of the products held by banks are understood by the public. If opacity
results in a competitive advantage, then we should expect banks to invest resources in
the development of assets which are hard to understand and to value for competitor
banks. Cheng, Dhaliwal and Neamtiu (2008) find that empirically banks that engage in
securitization transactions are more opaque than banks with no asset securitizations.
The review of the related literature has demonstrated that existing approaches to
bank transparency have found that not only the asset side of banks’ balance sheet but
also the particularities of their liability structure yields interesting implications for the
problem of optimal bank transparency. The model outlined above is sufficiently general
to encompass a wide range of financial intermediaries (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds).
Arguably, maturity transformation is a central characteristic of banks and should be
incorporated in the analysis in order to study the impact of public disclosure on the
stability of banks. After all, the renewed interest in the topic of bank transparency has
started with the recent crisis.
The introduction of a fragile liability structure could also shed new light on the re-
lated topic of bank contagion. Jones, Lee and Yeager (2012) have demonstrated the
tight empirical link between informational opacity and bank contagion. Slovin, Sushka
and Polonchek (1999) show that informational contagion occurs more frequently among
money center banks which process large financial flows through global networks, and less
often among regional banks which service a domestic-based clientele through branches
and subsidiaries. This finding is consistent with the notion that fierce competition and
information-intensive and complex investment activities in the market of money cen-
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ter banks result in increased informational opacity relative to less competitive regional
banking markets, where eventual information advantages are limited by the size of the
market and the characteristics of available assets.
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A. Proofs and Derivations
Proposition 3.3
Proof. The costs of a marginal investment in information acquisition must be equal to
the marginal benefits in terms of a more profitable and safer portfolio. The first order
condition for a socially efficient choice of gAt+1 reads as:
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
∣∣∣∣Rt}]
=
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} ∣∣∣∣Rt}]
= E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}] ∣∣∣∣Rt} = 0 .
For a given sample of observationsQt =
{
RˆAt+1, Rˆ
B
t+1, Rt
}
, information expenditures must
pay off by making this information more reliable and thereby increasing its social value.
Let ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt) denote the density of Rt+1 for a given sample of observations.
Then we can rewrite:
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}]
=
∂
∂ gAt+1
[ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt) dRt+1
]
=
∫ [
∂
∂ gAt+1
( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt)
+
( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt)
∂ gAt+1
]
dRt+1
= E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i
∂ u(c∗t+i)
∂ gAt+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}
+
∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt)
∂ gAt+1
dRt+1 .
The first term of this sum captures the consequences of information expenditures in
terms of a reallocation of resources, while the second term measures the implied changes
in the uncertainty regime which the planner has to face.
The envelope theorem allows us to abstract from indirect effects of changes in gAt+1
which are transmitted through its impact on other choice variables. To see this, consider
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the welfare effect of a change in b∗t+1 induced by the variation in g
A
t+1:
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i
∂ u(c∗t+i)
∂ b∗t+1
∂ b∗t+1
∂ gAt+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}
=
∂ b∗t+1
∂ gAt+1
[
− ∂ u(c
∗
t )
∂ c∗t
+ β E
{
∂ u(c∗t+1)
∂ c∗t+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}] .
Note that the optimal choice of b∗t+1 =
(
RˆAt+1, Rˆ
B
t+1, Rt
)
is defined by:
∂ u(c∗t )
∂ c∗t
= β E
{
∂ u(c∗t+1)
∂ c∗t+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} .
The same reasoning applies to indirect effects of changes in gAt+1 transmitted through
other choice variables, e.g. k∗t+1. It follows that:
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i
∂ u(c∗t+i)
∂ gAt+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} = − β E{∂ u(c∗t+i)∂ c∗t+1
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} .
Increasing investment in information acquisition reduces the resources available at date
t+ 1 for consumption. Now, the first order condition for a socially efficient choice of gAt
boils down to:
β E
{
∂ u(c∗t+1)
∂ c∗t+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} = E{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt)
∂ gAt+1
dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} .
The density of Rt+1 depends on g
A
t+1 through its conditional variance as given by:
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} = σ2ΣAt+1ΣBt+1σ2ΣAt+1 + σ2ΣBt+1 + ΣAt+1ΣBt+1 .
Since we know that:
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}
∂ gAt+1
= −Var{Rt+1 ∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}2 f ′(gAt+1) ,
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we can rewrite the first order condition for gAt according to:
β E
{
∂ u(c∗t+1)
∂ c∗t+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}
= E
{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|Qt)
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣Qt} ∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣Qt}
∂ gAt+1
dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}
= −Var{Rt+1∣∣Qt}2 f ′(gAt+1) E{∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(c∗t+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|Qt)
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣Qt} dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} ,
where Qt =
{
RˆAt+1, Rˆ
B
t+1, Rt
}
. The function f(g) is increasing, strictly concave and
satisfies the Inada conditions, e.g. f ′(0) = ∞ and f ′(∞) = 0. Furthermore, u(c) is
strictly concave. By Jensen’s inequality, a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
Rt+1 lowers expected welfare. It follows that the right hand side of the equation above
is strictly positive.
For gAt+1 = 0, the marginal benefit of increasing information expenses on the right
hand side of the equation above exceeds the associated costs on the left hand side.
As gAt+1 goes towards infinity, its marginal benefits shrink while the marginal costs in
terms of expected welfare are growing without bounds. Only an interior choice of gA
∗
t+1
can satisfy the first order condition. The analogue reasoning holds for the entirely
symmetric problem of selecting gB
∗
t+1. Concavity of f(g) implies that the planner will
optimally invest equal amounts in the precision of both signals.
Proposition 3.5
Proof. In the neighborhood of the optimal level of gAt+1, a marginal adjustment must
increase households’ valuation of bank A securities just as much as it increases the value
of bank B securities.
E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, Rt}] ∣∣∣∣Rt}
= E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cBt+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆBt+1, Rt}] ∣∣∣∣Rt}.
Under complete opacity, the latter term is zero. The first order condition for an optimal
choice of gAt+1 becomes:
E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣ RˆAt+1, Rt}] ∣∣∣∣Rt} = 0 .
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Applying the same reasoning as in the proof to Proposition 3.3 above, we can rewrite
this first order condition according to:
β E
{
∂ u(ct+1)
∂ ct+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} = E{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|RˆAt+1, Rt)
∂ gAt+1
dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} .
This is equivalent to:
β E
{
∂ u(ct+1)
∂ ct+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}
= −Var{Rt+1∣∣QAt }2 f ′(gAt+1) E{∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} ,
where QAt =
{
RˆAt+1, Rt
}
. Under opacity, bankers face a higher degree of uncertainty
than under transparency for given levels of information expenses:
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣ RˆAt+1, Rt} = σ2 ΣAt+1σ2 + ΣAt+1 >
σ2ΣAt+1Σ
B
t+1
σ2ΣAt+1 + σ
2ΣBt+1 + Σ
A
t+1Σ
B
t+1
= Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣ RˆAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} .
Also, household welfare is reduced with respect to the case of exogenous transparency for
a given level of gAt+1. This is because both hoseholds’ savings decisions as well as banks’
portfolio choice are based on less information now. Non-increasing absolute risk aversion
implies that given increases in uncertainty become more costly as expected consumption
levels fall. It follows that:
0 < gA
∗
t+1 = g
B∗
t+1 < g
A∗∗
t+1 = g
B∗∗
t+1 < ∞ .
Lemma 4.1
Proof. The first order condition of gAt+1 is given by:
E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∣∣∣∣QHt }] ∣∣∣∣Rt}
= E
{
∂
∂ gAt+1
[
E
{
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cBt+i)
∣∣∣∣QBt } ∣∣∣∣QHt }] ∣∣∣∣Rt}.
In the absence of complete opacity, the term on the right hand side of the equation above
is generally not zero. The quality of bank B’s portfolio choice benefits to some degree
from the increased precision of bank A’s private signal. The uncertainty which banker
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B faces when she chooses her investment portfolio depends on the precision of bank A’s
signal:
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt} = σ2 (ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1 )ΣBt+1
σ2
(
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)
+ σ2ΣBt+1 +
(
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)
ΣBt+1
.
Information expenditures by bank A reduce this uncertainty:
∂Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}
∂gAt+1
= −Var{Rt+1 ∣∣QAt+1, RˆBt+1, Rt}2( ΣAt+1
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2
f ′(gAt+1) .
Note that banker B’s level of uncertainty is independent of gAt+1 under complete opacity
(Σˆt+1 = ∞). The dependence on gAt+1 becomes stronger for higher degrees of trans-
parency and information spillovers. Applying the same reasoning as in the proof to
Proposition 3.3 above, we can rewrite the first order condition of gAt+1 according to:
β E
{
∂ u(ct+1)
∂ ct+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}
= −Var{Rt+1∣∣QAt }2 f ′(gAt+1) E{∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}
+ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QBt }2 f ′(gAt+1) ( ΣAt+1
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2
E
{∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cBt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QBt )
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QBt } dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt}.
In equilibrium, both banks spend identical amounts on information acquisition. Hence,
ex-ante their expected beliefs are identical:
E
{
ϕ(Rt+1 |QAt )
∣∣∣∣Rt} = E{ϕ(Rt+1 |QBt ) ∣∣∣∣Rt} .
Likewise, the symmetry of equilibrium implies:
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } = Var{Rt+1 ∣∣QBt } .
Hence, we can rewrite the first order condition of gAt+1:
β E
{
∂ u(ct+1)
∂ ct+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} = −Var{Rt+1 ∣∣QAt }2 f ′(gAt+1) [ 1 − ( ΣAt+1ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 ]
E
{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+iu(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } dRt+1
∣∣∣∣Rt} .
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Under complete transparency (Σˆt+1 = 0), the right hand side of this equation is always
zero and so is the optimal choice of gAt+1. As Σˆt+1 is growing, the rival bank participates
less and less in improvements to bank A’s information set.
Note that:
lim
Σˆt+1→∞
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[(
ΣAt+1
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 ]
= lim
Σˆt+1→∞
[
− 2 Σ
A
t+1
2(
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)3 ] = 0 ,
and also:
lim
Σˆt+1→∞
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } ] = lim
Σˆt+1→∞
[(
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 ]
= 0 .
For high values of opacity, the signal-to-noise ratio of banks’ public signals becomes less
and less responsive to additional changes in opacity. This is reflected by the vanishing
dependence of the optimal choice of gAt+1 on the degree of information spillovers:
lim
Σˆt+1→∞
g′(Σˆt+1) = 0 .
Proposition 4.2
Proof. The first order condition for a socially optimal choice of Σˆt+1 is given by:
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
E
{
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∣∣∣∣QHt }] = 0 .
A change in opacity has two effects on welfare: (1.) uncertainty for households varies
with the informational content of QHt = {QAt+1, QBt+1, Rt}, and (2.) the uncertainty for
banks is affected through QAt = {RˆAt+1, QBt+1, Rt}. This can be seen from rewriting:
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
E
{
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∣∣∣∣QHt }]
=
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[ ∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ϕ(Rt+1|QHt ) dRt+1 ] .
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From the product rule, it follows that:
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[ ∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ϕ(Rt+1|QHt ) dRt+1 ]
=
∫
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt }]ϕ(Rt+1|QHt ) dRt+1
+
∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QHt )∂ Σˆt+1 dRt+1
= E
{
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt }] ∣∣∣∣QHt }
+
∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QHt )∂ Σˆt+1 dRt+1 .
The first term of this sum captures households’ expectations about how the change in
opacity will affect the precision of bank A’s forecast of Rt+1:
E
{
∂
∂ Σˆt+1
[
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt }] ∣∣∣∣QHt }
= E
{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+iu(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂ Σˆt+1
dRt+1
∣∣∣∣QHt } .
Hence, the first order condition for Σˆt+1 becomes:
E
{ ∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+iu(cAt+i)
)
∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂ Σˆt+1
dRt+1
∣∣∣∣QHt }
+
∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∂ ϕ(Rt+1|QHt )∂ Σˆt+1 dRt+1 = 0 .
Opacity affects the beliefs of banker A (first term of the sum above) as well as the expec-
tations of households (second term). This effect works through the induced variations
in uncertainty. Households’ uncertainty is given by:
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt } = σ2 (ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1) (ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1)
σ2(ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1) + σ
2(ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1) + (Σ
A
t+1 + Σˆt+1)(Σ
B
t+1 + Σˆt+1)
.
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This uncertainty responds to changes in opacity in the following way:
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt }
∂ Σˆt+1
= Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt }2
(
∂ ΣAt+1
∂ Σˆt+1
+ 1
)(
ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2
+
(
∂ ΣBt+1
∂ Σˆt+1
+ 1
)(
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2
(
ΣAt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 (
ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 .
In the absence of positive effects on information production, households’ uncertainty
would always increase in opacity. What about banks’ uncertainty?
Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } = σ2 ΣAt+1 (ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1)
σ2ΣAt+1 + σ
2(ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1) + Σ
A
t+1(Σ
B
t+1 + Σˆt+1)
.
Also banks’ uncertainty varies with opacity:
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }
∂ Σˆt+1
= Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }2
∂ ΣAt+1
∂ Σˆt+1
(
ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2
+
(
∂ ΣBt+1
∂ Σˆt+1
+ 1
)
ΣAt+1
2
ΣAt+1
2
(
ΣBt+1 + Σˆt+1
)2 .
Again, in the absence of positive effects on information production, banks’ uncertainty
would always increase in opacity. But note that:
∂ Σjt+1
∂ Σˆt+1
= − Σjt+1
2
f ′(gjt+1) g
′(Σˆt+1) ,
which is always negative. By Lemma 4.1, this term converges to zero as opacity tends
towards infinity. At Σˆt+1 = 0, its value is −∞. Information production is highly
responsive for low levels of opacity. This sensitivity falls as opacity is increased.
This implies for the uncertainty of households and bankers, respectively:
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt }
∂ Σˆt+1
< 0 , and
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }
∂ Σˆt+1
< 0 , for Σˆt+1 = 0 .
In the neighborhood of complete transparency, a local increase in opacity actually de-
creases uncertainty. This is because the positive effect of opacity on information pro-
duction outweighs the increase in noise of banks’ public signals. The opposite is true for
high levels of opacity:
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt }
∂ Σˆt+1
> 0 , and
∂ Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }
∂ Σˆt+1
> 0 , for Σˆt+1 =∞ .
In the neighborhood of complete opacity, a marginal reduction of opacity reduces ag-
gregate uncertainty for households without affecting information production by banks
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in any significant way. Reconsider now the first order condition of Σˆt+1:
∂Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt }
∂Σˆt+1
E
{∫ ( ∞∑
i=0
βt+iu(cAt+i)
)
∂ϕ(Rt+1|QAt )
∂Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QAt } dRt+1
∣∣∣∣QHt }
+
∂Var
{
Rt+1
∣∣QHt }
∂Σˆt+1
∫
E
{ ∞∑
i=0
βt+i u(cAt+i)
∣∣∣∣QAt } ∂ϕ(Rt+1|QHt )∂Var{Rt+1 ∣∣QHt } dRt+1 = 0 .
It becomes clear that the social benefits of increasing opacity are positive at Σˆt+1 = 0.
The opposite is true for Σˆt+1 =∞.
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